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INTRODUCTION 
[1] Sexual exploitation of children is a real and disturbing problem. 
However, when it comes to the sentencing of child pornography 
possessors, the U.S. federal system has a problem, as well. This Article 
adds to the current, heated discussion on what is happening in the 
sentencing of federal child pornography possession offenses, why nobody 
is satisfied, and how much the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are to 
blame. At the heart of this Article are the forgotten players in the 
discussion—computers and the Internet—and their role in changing the 
realities of child pornography possession. This Article argues that 
computers and the Internet are important factors in understanding both the 
victimization of the children portrayed in the illegal images and the 
formulation of appropriate punishment for those who view and possess 
such images. Discussion on the topic thus far has failed to pay proper 
attention to the effect computer behavior and the Internet have on the 
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manner in which offenders possess child pornography and to the type and 
extent of punishment that is appropriate, given the characteristics of that 
possession. While some district judges are thinking about these issues 
when they impose sentences, they have little guidance from experts in the 
fields of punishment and sexual crimes because sentencing guidance 
provided to judges has largely been restricted to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. In promulgating Guidelines for child pornography possession 
offenses, the United States Sentencing Commission has largely treated the 
possession offenses as traditional possession crimes, and has been 
increasingly influenced by Congress’ response to political pressure to 
severely punish such offenders without regard to the stated purposes of 
punishment. Now that the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, many 
judges are forgoing the Guidelines’ advice when it comes to sentencing 
the possessors of child pornography and forging out on their own. These 
judges often receive criticism for being too lenient. While there may be 
some truth to that assessment, what is even more apparent is that: judges 
are ill-equipped to respond to the punishment needs of this group of 
offenders; critics of lenient sentences often discount the faults in the 
Guidelines; and the computer and Internet, the root of controversy, have 
been largely overlooked in the sentencing discussion. A system reboot is 
in order. 
[2] Part I of this Article will introduce the genuine problem of the 
sexual exploitation of children that this country faces. It will explain the 
specific federal crime of child pornography possession and the typical 
methods taken to commit the crime. Part II will focus on the sentencing of 
child pornography possessors, explaining the current Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines approach, the rebellion of some district judges against the 
Guidelines’ advisory sentencing ranges for these crimes, and the criticism 
levied at those judges. Together, Parts I and II expose the system failure 
that requires a rebooting of the sentencing approach. In Part III, the Article 
will suggest a new manner of thinking about child pornography possession 
as a computer crime that is very different from ordinary possession crimes. 
This new approach seeks to understand computers and the Internet to 
develop a system of punishment that will at least move toward achieving 
the congressionally identified goals of punishment. Ultimately, it is neither 
the purpose of this Article to suggest an appropriate range of sentences for 
child pornography possession; nor is it necessarily the goal to have the 
Guidelines ranges for child pornography possessors reduced. Rather, this 
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Article emphasizes the necessity of finding a method of giving meaningful 
guidance to district judges so that they are able to more appropriately 
punish child pornography possessors. This is impossible to do without 
making the punishment fit the specific realities of computer and Internet 
crimes. 
I.  THE REAL HARMS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION 
[3] The possession of child pornography is an offense that sheds light 
on the horrific market that exists in the sexual exploitation of children. 
Each image is a reminder of the abuse, molestation, and sexual 
victimization of a child. Although the main purpose of this Article is to 
discuss the offense of child pornography possession in particular, it is 
necessary to delve into the creation and distribution of child pornography  
to understand the stories behind its possession. 
[4] The Child Pornography Prevention Act defines child pornography 
as “any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or 
computer or computer-generated image or picture,” containing sexually 
explicit conduct involving a minor.
1
 This can range from images of 
exposed genitalia to more explicit sexual abuse of children under the age 
of eighteen, such as bondage or penetration by adults or objects.
2
 These 
 
                                                                                                                         
1
 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006). In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court 
held that the ban on virtual child pornography in the CPPA was unconstitutional. 535 
U.S. 234, 244–45 (2002). The Court described virtual child pornography as images “that 
appear to depict minors but were produced by means other than using real children, such 
as through the use of youthful-looking adults or computer-imaging technology.” Id. at 
234. However, since Ashcroft, Congress has enacted the Prosecutorial Remedies & Tools 
Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act). Pub. L. No. 
108-21, 117 Stat 650 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). This Act 
prohibits pornographic materials that are “indistinguishable from” child pornography. 18 
U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B). This Article, however, is primarily concerned with images that do 
depict real children when that can be proven. 
2
 Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, What is Child Pornography?, 
http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US
&PageId=1504 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010); see also Audrey Rogers, Child 
Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847, 852–53 (2008) (discussing 
damage caused by child pornography). 
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images depict a variety of age ranges of children, including pubescent 
minors, pre-pubescent minors, and even infants or toddlers.
3
 According to 
the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, in more than half 
of child pornography cases, the victimization of the children appearing in 
these images resulted from acts by people they know, such as “parents, 
other relatives, neighborhood/family friends, babysitters, and coaches.”
4
 
The still image or video captures the abuse.
5
  
[5] Originally, distribution of child pornography took place through 
real, physical images in print media; however, computers and Internet now 
play a predominate role in the distribution of such images.
6
 It is 
inexpensive to produce and memorialize child pornography on videotape, 
film, CD-ROM, or DVD, to name a few formats.
7
 The pornographic 
information can be loaded onto the creator’s computer and then distributed 
via the Internet in a variety of manners, including Internet chat rooms, 
instant messages, e-mail, and websites.
8
 While the popularity of fee based 
websites has decreased among child pornography sharers, use of programs 
that create peer-to-peer networks is increasing.
9
 These networks simplify 
 
                                                                                                                         
3
 Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, supra note 2 (“Of the child pornography 
victims identified by law enforcement, 42% appear to be pubescent, 52% appear to be 
prepubescent, and 6% appear to be infants or toddlers.”). 
4
 Id. 
5
 See id. 
6
 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1028 
(2001) (“Whereas a piece of child pornography once might have only reached a few 
thousand people who bought a magazine, with the internet it can reach millions very 
quickly.”). 
7
 Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, supra note 2.  
8
 Id.  
9
 Id.; see Lee Hollander, Tactics for Defending Computer Pornography Charges, in 
STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY CASES: LEADING LAWYERS ON 
ANALYZING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS, UTILIZING EXPERT WITNESSES, AND EXPLAINING 
TECHNOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 57, 60–61 (Aspatore ed., 2008). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XVI, Issue 3 
5 
file sharing between several individual computer users.
10
 Thus, the illegal 
market uses the Internet both to grow and to frustrate law enforcement 
efforts.  
[6] While the sexual exploitation of children occurs worldwide, it is 
not necessary to look beyond the United States to gain an understanding of 
the vastness of the problem. Estimates reveal that over 200,000 children in 
America were at risk of commercial sexual exploitation in 2001, including 
becoming victims of child pornography, juvenile prostitution, and sexual 
trafficking.
11
 When the focus shifts to the Internet, the situation becomes 
even more disturbing. A congressionally funded study conducted in 2000, 
found that one in five youths between the ages ten and seventeen that 
regularly use the Internet have received unwanted sexual solicitation over 
the Internet.
12
 Further, it has been widely reported that eighty-nine percent 
of sexual solicitations of youth occur in Internet chat rooms.
13
 The Child 
Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the U.S. Department of Justice 
(CEOS) is dedicated “to protect the welfare of America’s children and 
 
                                                                                                                         
10
 For an explanation of peer-to-peer file sharing networks, see Hollander, supra note 9; 
Bradley Mitchell, Introduction to Peer to Peer (P2P) Networks and Software Systems, 
http://compnetworking.about.com/od/p2ppeertopeer/a/p2pintroduction.htm (last visited 
March 10, 2010). 
11
 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS), Child 
Prostitution: Domestic Sex Trafficking of Minors, http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/ceos/prostitution.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010.); RICHARD J. ESTES & NEIL 
ALAN WEINER, U OF PA., COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE U.S, 
CANADA AND MEXICO, 2, available at http://www.sp2.upenn.edu/~restes/CSEC_ 
Files/Complete_ CSEC_020220.pdf. 
12
 THE CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RES. CTR., ONLINE VICTIMIZATION: A REPORT ON 
THE NATION’S YOUTH, http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC62.pdf. 
13
 See Att’y Gen. of Va., Child Internet Safety: Tips for Parents, available at 
http://www.oag.state.va.us/KEY_ISSUES/PREDATORS/Internet_Tips_for_Parents.html 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2010) (citing PEW Study reported in Journal of the American 
Medical Association); see also Donna Rice Hughes, Sexual Predators Online, available 
at http://www.protectkids.com/dangers/onlinepred.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2010); 
GuardChild.Com, Internet Statistics, http://www.guardchild.com/statistics.php (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
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communities by enforcing federal criminal statutes relating to the 
exploitation of children and obscenity.”
14
 CEOS worries that the Internet 
has made certain crimes against children, especially child pornography 
crimes, easier to commit but harder to prevent,.
15
  
[7] Certainly, when the focus shifts from other sexual exploitation 
crimes against children to the child pornography market in particular, the 
impact of the Internet is overwhelming. This huge, illegal industry is 
prolific on the Internet, with at least 100,000 websites containing child 
pornography.
16
 Data reveals that the websites exist to feed a very real 
market for child pornography. For instance, the file-sharing network 
Gnutella has reported receiving 116,000 requests for child pornography.
17
 
Further, the child pornography industry’s annual revenue is estimated to 
be approximately three billion dollars.
18
 It is an undeniable fact that the 
development, distribution, and possession of child pornography are real, 
far-reaching problems. Therefore, it is quite easy to justify the time and 
 
                                                                                                                         
14
 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
15
 See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Child Pornography, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/childporn.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010) 
(explaining that computers and the Internet has made the production and distribution of 
child pornography easier); see also U.S. Dep’t of Just., Child Exploitation and Obscenity 
Section, CEOS Mission, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/index.html (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2010) (“CEOS is focused on waging an aggressive battle to protect children 
from individuals who use computers or the United States mails to sexually abuse and 
exploit them.”). 
16
 Posting of Cy.Talk Blog, Pornography Industry is Larger than the Revenues of the Top 
Technology, http://blog.cytalk.com/2010/01/web-porn-revenue/ (Jan. 1, 2010).  
17
 Id. 
18
 Press Release, Internet Filter Review, TopTenReviews Releases Porn Industry 
Statistics (Feb. 6, 2004), available at http://www.toptenreviews.com/2-6-04.html. 
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resources allocated to protecting children from sexual exploitation, 
including child pornography possession.
19
 
II.  THE SENTENCING OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS 
[8] Just as the manner in which child pornography crimes are 
committed varies, the punishments imposed for the variety of crimes in 
this category differ greatly. The production of child pornography carries a 
mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years, with a maximum of thirty 
years imprisonment.
20
 The distribution and receipt of child pornography is 
punishable by a mandatory minimum of five years imprisonment but can 
be punished up to twenty years.
21
 Simple possession of child pornography 
carries a maximum of ten years imprisonment.
22
 All of these punishments, 
however, can be aggravated for repeat offenders.
23
 For instance, the 
minimum sentence for the possession of child pornography by someone 
with a previous conviction of certain other sex offenses increases to ten 
years and carries a maximum of twenty years imprisonment.
24
 In the 
federal system, the common thread between all of these punishments is a 
steady increase in punishment,
25
 often without much explanation and even 
less study. 
 
                                                                                                                         
19
 Numerous agencies, initiatives, and programs have been created to combat sex offenses 
against children, especially pornography offenses, such as: the Nat’l Ctr. for Missing and 
Exploited Children (www.missingkids.com); the Internet Crimes Against Children Task 
Force (www.icactraining.org); and the Innocent Images Project (www.fbi.gov/ 
publications/innocent.htm). 
20
 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (2006). 
21
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(b)(1), 2252A(b)(1). 
22
 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). 
23
 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(e), 2252(b)(1), 2252A(b)(1), 2252A(b)(2). 
24
 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). 
25
 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) was amended in 2003 to increase the maximum 
punishment for distributing or receiving child pornography from fifteen years to twenty 
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A.  The Upward Trend of Child Pornography Punishment
26
 
[9] The Sentencing Commission explains that “numerous legislative 
changes (particularly statutorily prescribed mandatory minimum 
sentences) and amendments to the sex offense guidelines (e.g., increased 
base offense levels) have resulted in substantial sentence increases for 
[sex] offenders.”
27
 Before the enactment of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines in 1987, there was no statute criminalizing the simple 
possession of child pornography.
28
 Within three years, Congress made the 
possession of child pornography a federal crime.
29
  The Sentencing 
Commission subsequently created a new Guidelines section, § 2G2.4, 
which assigned a base offense level of ten for simple possession.
30
 Under 
this section, an offender would receive a two-level enhancement for 
possessing images of a prepubescent or minor under twelve years old.
31
 
 
                                                                                                                         
years for first time offenders. PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 103(B)(i), 
117 Stat 650 (2003). 
26
 This Article often refers to “simple possession”. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) also 
criminalizes the receipt of child pornography. It is unclear how one can receive without 
ever possessing, though it is possible for the producer of the child pornography to possess 
it without receiving it. However, simple possession refers to the possession of child 
pornography without the intent to distribute it. Therefore, in cases other than the producer 
of the pornography, the distinction between simple possession and receipt is unclear. See 
United States v. Olander, 572 F.3d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 2009). This Article focuses on 
simple possession in an effort to simplify the language used to describe the offense of 
having child pornography in one’s possession without any manifested intent to distribute 
it, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5). 
27
 UNITED STATES SENT’G COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. 
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 116 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
booker_report/booker_report.pdf.  
28
 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2009). 
29
 See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-647, §§ 323(a)–(b), 104 Stat. 4789, 
4818–19. 
30
 Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 56 Fed. Reg. 1846, 1863 (Jan. 17, 
1991). 
31
 Id. 
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Although these changes took effect on November 1, 1991,
32
 by November 
27, there was already a significant change to the Guidelines governing the 
punishment of child pornography offenses, including the sentence 
calculation for possession.
33
 As a result of a Senate Bill introduced while 
most senators were in committee meetings, the base offense level for 
simple possession of child pornography increased to thirteen, and added a 
new, two-level enhancement for the possession of ten or more items.
34
 
House Resolution 1240 led to another set of increases in these penalties 
that took effect in 1996.
35
  The new base offense level for possession of 
child pornography was fifteen, and another two-level enhancement—this 
time for possession as a result of computer use—was added to the list of 
existing enhancements.
36
 
[10] The computer enhancements seemingly took on a mind of their 
own—one divorced from the stated legislative purpose of “help[ing] our 
law enforcement efforts in this area keep pace with changing technology 
by increasing the penalties for the use of computers in connection with the 
distribution of child pornography.”
37
 In reality, the computer 
enhancements are out of touch with the actual effects of “changing 
technology” when it comes to the criminal world of child pornography.
38
 
Because the steady increase in the Guidelines for child pornography 
possession had a lot to do with enhancements given for possessing child 
pornography on computers, it is important to understand how the 
 
                                                                                                                         
32
 Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C amend. 372 (2009). 
33
 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C amend. 436. 
34
 See 137 CONG. REC. S10322 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (statement of Sen. Helms). 
35
 See Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-71, 109 Stat. 
774. 
36
 Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 61 Fed. Reg. 20,306 (May 6, 1996). 
37
 See 141 CONG. REC. S5519 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
38
 The change in the methods of possessing child pornography that are due to 
advancements in technology will be discussed in Part III. 
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computer enhancements have greatly affected and complicated today’s 
Sentencing Guidelines for child pornography possession.  
[11] The first complication took place in 2000, when the Commission 
was directed to clarify the term “item” in the child pornography 
Guidelines to include a computer file.
39
 Consequently, the two-level 
increase that child pornography possessors could incur for ten or more 
items would apply to computer files, in addition to the two-level increase 
for computer usage. By 2003, simple possession, still carrying a base 
offense level of fifteen, carried a possibility of five enhancements for 
specific characteristics of a defendant.
40
 In addition to the enhancements 
already mentioned, there was also a four-level enhancement if material 
portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct, or other violence, as well as 
several enhancements related to the number of images possessed.
41
 Images 
were differentiated from items, with an item being capable of holding 
several images.
42
 Thus, a computer file counting as one item that could 
potentially hold several images depicting child pornography. According to 
the new § 2G2.4: 10 to 150 images warranted a two-level enhancement; 
150 to 300 images led to a three-level enhancement; 300 to 600 images 
resulted in a four-level enhancement; and more than 600 images would 
increase a base offense level by five levels.
43
 Though a clarification 
regarding the potential for item/image double counting was made in 
2004,
44
it did not simplify the calculation or lessen the punishment for 
child pornography possessors.  
[12] To comply with the new, higher mandatory minimums and 
statutory maximums set forth by the PROTECT Act of 2003, the 
 
                                                                                                                         
39
 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C amend. 592 (2009). 
40
 See id. at amend. 649. 
41
 Id.  
42
 Id. at amend. 592. 
43
 Id. at amend. 649. 
44
 Id. at amend. 664. 
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Sentencing Commission made major changes to the child pornography 
guidelines in 2004.
45
 The Act removed the two-level enhancement for ten 
or more items, but increased the base offense level for simple child 
pornography possession to eighteen.
46
  The relevant portions of U.S. 
Sentencing Guideline § 2G2.2—the new and current guidelines for child 
pornography possession—are as follows: 
Base Offense Level: 18  
Enhancements for Specific Offense Characteristics: 
 1) If the material involved a prepubescent minor or 
a minor who had not attained the age of 12 years, increase 
by 2 levels;  
 2) If the offense involved material that portrays 
sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of 
violence, increase by 4 levels; 
 3) If the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity 
involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor, 
increase by 5 levels;  
 4) If the offense involved the use of a computer or 
an interactive computer service for the possession, 
transmission, receipt, or distribution of the material, or for 
accessing with intent to view the material, increase by 2 
levels;  
 
                                                                                                                         
45
 See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (2006); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. 
C amend. 664 (2009). 
46
 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C amend. 664. 
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 5) If the offense involved: 
 a) at least 10 images, but fewer than 150, 
increase by 2 levels;  
 b) at least 150 images, but fewer than 300, 
increase by 3 levels;  
 c) at least 300 images, but fewer than 600, 
increase by 4 levels; and  
 d) 600 or more images, increase by 5 levels.
47
  
[13] In his article, “Deconstructing the Myth of Careful Study: A 
Primer on the Flawed Progression of the Child Pornography Guidelines,” 
Troy Stabenow uses “two hypothetical, but statistically typical 
defendants” to clearly demonstrate how the current Guidelines for child 
pornography possession operate, and how those Guidelines have changed 
over time.
48
 In Stabenow’s hypothetical, both defendants are convicted of 
possessing child pornography and sentenced pursuant to § 2G2.2.
49
 
Stabenow gives the second hypothetical defendant the following specific 
offense characteristics and indicates the percentage of real-life child 
pornography possession offenders who share those characteristics: 
1) Possessed a picture depicting a child under the age of 12 
(93.5%); 
2) Used a computer to obtain the image (93.1%); and 
 
                                                                                                                         
47
 Id. § 2G2.2. 
48
 See TROY STABENOW, DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTH OF CAREFUL STUDY: A PRIMER ON 
THE FLAWED PROGRESSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 1–2, 27 (2009), 
available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/child%20porn%20july%20revision.pdf. 
49
 Id. at 27–28. 
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3) Had one disk containing two movie files and 10 pictures, 
equating to 160 pictures (38% had at least 150 pictures, 
63.1% had greater than 10 images).
50
 
[14] The second hypothetical defendant “pleads guilty in a timely 
fashion and receives the maximum standard reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility,” even though he “has no criminal history and has never 
abused or exploited a child.”
51
 The Guidelines ranges that would apply to 
Stabenow’s second defendant at the key stages of the child pornography 
guidelines’ development are: 
1) April 30, 1987: No punishment - not illegal. 
2) November 1, 1991: 6-12 months. 
3) November 27, 1991: 12-18 months. 
4) November 1, 1996: 21-27 months. 
5) April 30, 2003: 30-37 months. 
6) November 1, 2004: 41-51 months.
52
 
In sum, the Commission directed courts to impose a sentence of, at most, 
one year of imprisonment for child pornography possession in 1991, and 
that directive increased to over four years in prison thirteen years later.
53
  
[15] To add to Stabenow’s example, consider how each applicable 
enhancement moves the hypothetical defendant from one sentencing range 
to another under today’s Guidelines. With a base offense level of eighteen 
and a criminal history category of I, the defendant would have a 
 
                                                                                                                         
50
 Id. at 28. 
51
 Id.  
52
 Id. at 28–29. 
53
 See id. at 29.  
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Guidelines range of twenty-seven to thirty-three months of 
imprisonment.
54
 The two-level enhancement for possessing an image 
depicting a child under twelve-years-old increases the Guidelines range to 
thirty-three to forty-one months of imprisonment.
55
 Additionally, the two-
level enhancement for the use of a computer takes the applicable range up 
to forty-one to fifty-one months of imprisonment.
56
 Finally, the three-level 
increase for having 150 to 300 images raises the Guidelines range to fifty-
seven to seventy-one months of imprisonment.
57
  
[16] This progression shows that a few enhancements that apply in most 
child pornography possession cases take the possible Guidelines sentence 
from just over two years to nearly six years. If there were developments 
made over the years suggesting that such an increase was necessary to 
affect the goals of punishment, then this progression might not be 
disturbing. But there is no information from the Sentencing Commission 
indicating that the steady increase was warranted by the purposes of 
sentencing that have been identified by Congress: punishment, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
58
 In fact, at many points within this 
 
                                                                                                                         
54
 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.5, pt. A (2009). 
55
 See id. 
56
 See id. 
57
 See id. 
58
 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006) Specifically, the section states that the sentencing 
court shall consider  
the need for the sentence imposed: (A) to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment 
for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) 
to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner . . . . 
Id. Congress has directed the Sentencing Commission to establish sentencing practices 
that meet these purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
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upward progression of the child pornography guidelines, the Sentencing 
Commission criticized the direction Congress was taking, especially when 
it came to the computer enhancements.
59
 The Commission stressed, “[n]ot 
all computer use is equal,” and suggested Congress “develop a more 
finely-tuned system of apportioning punishment in cases involving the use 
of computers.”
60
 Recently, a growing number of district judges are 
demonstrating their disagreement with the increased, unreasoned 
sentences by apportioning punishment without deference to the Sentencing 
Commission.  
B.  The Judicial Response 
[17] District judges are speaking out about their belief that the 
Guidelines treat child pornography crimes, especially possession, 
unreasonably harsh. A series of regional, public hearings held by the 
Sentencing Commission between 2009 and 2010 provided the perfect 
stage for judges to air such grievances.
61
 In her remarks at the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission public hearing in November 2009, Western 
District of Oklahoma Judge Robin J. Cauthron stated:  
 The Guideline sentences for child pornography 
cases are often too harsh where the defendant’s crime is 
solely possession unaccompanied by an indication of 
“acting out” behavior on the part of [the] defendant. It is 
too often the case[,] that a defendant appears to be a social 
misfit looking at dirty pictures in the privacy of his own 
 
                                                                                                                         
59
 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: SEX OFFENSES AGAINST 
CHILDREN 30 (1996), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/scac.pdf. In the 1996 
Report to Congress, after the introduction of computer enhancements, the Sentencing 
Commission questioned why Congress made the increase without any legislative record 
to explain the reasoning. See id. at 30 n.23. 
60
 Id. at 29–30. 
61
 See generally Public Hearing Testimony & Transcript: 2009–2010 Regional public 
Hearings, available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings.htm. 
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home without any real prospect of touching or otherwise 
acting out as to any person.
62
  
Judge Cauthron recognized child pornography as “foul,” but still 
questioned the sensibility of the computer enhancements;
63
 stating: “As 
widespread as computer use is now, enhancing for use of a computer is a 
little like penalizing speeding but then adding an extra penalty if a car is 
involved.”
64
  
[18] During that same public hearing, Eastern District of Louisiana 
Judge Jay C. Zainey took issue with the statutory minimums applicable to 
child pornography cases.
65
 Judge Zainey referred to the effects of those 
minimums as “too harsh in certain circumstances,” especially when it 
comes to first offenders.
66
 Though Judge Zainey analyzed the 
congressionally mandated statutory minimums and not the Guidelines 
themselves,
67
 the continual increases of the applicable Guidelines for child 
pornography offenses were promulgated to comply with congressionally 
imposed statutory minimums and other directives.
68
 
 
                                                                                                                         
62
 Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 5 (Nov. 2009) (statement of Robin J. 
Cauthron, Judge, W.D. Okla.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/ 
20091119/Cauthron.pdf. 
63
 Id. at 5–6. 
64
 Id. at 6. 
65
 Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 1–3 (Nov. 2009) (statement of Jay C. 
Zainey, Judge, E.D. La.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/ 
20091119/Zainey.pdf.  
66
 Id. at 3. 
67
 Id. at 1–3. 
68
 See supra Part II.A. 
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[19] Just four months earlier, at another hearing in this series of 
regional public hearings, Western District of New York Judge Richard J. 
Arcara gave a statement questioning the purpose of the many 
enhancements that could be applied to child pornography cases, especially 
in the cases of possession.
69
  Specifically, Judge Arcara asked: “Is the 
person who downloads hundreds of images indiscriminately more 
dangerous than one who downloads 50 or 60 specific kinds of images?”
70
 
By noting that “numerous enhancements apply to every child pornography 
offender;” Judge Acara questioned whether the Guidelines “assist the 
Court in identifying factors that distinguish a defendant who is a threat to 
the community and likely to reoffend from one who is not.”
71
 Throughout 
this hearing and the other regional public hearings, other judges also 
mentioned that the Commission ought to reexamine the sentences for child 
pornography offenses.
72
 Western District of Pennsylvania Judge Donetta 
 
                                                                                                                         
69
 Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 8–9 (July 2009) (statement of Richard 
J. Arcara, Judge, W.D.N.Y.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20090709/ 
Arcara_Testimony.pdf. 
70
 Id. at 8–9. 
71
 Id. at 9. 
72
 See, e.g., Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 5 (Nov. 2009) (statement 
of Edith H. Jones, Chief Judge, 5th Cir.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
AGENDAS/20091119/Jones.pdf (noting that the Guidelines are unevenly applied in the 
case of child pornography offenses); Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 1 
(Oct. 2009) (statement of Robert W. Pratt, Chief Dist. Judge, S.D. Iowa), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20091020/Pratt_Testimony.pdf (“Sentences are 
routinely more harsh and punitive than they need to be, especially in run-of-the-mill . . . 
pornography cases.”); Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 4–5 (July 2009) 
(statement of Nancy Gertner, Dist. Judge, Mass. Dist. Ct.), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20090709/Gertner_Testimony.pdf (noting that 
departures in pornography cases indicate problems with the Guidelines); Federal 
Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Reg’l 
Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 11 (July. 2009) (statement of Jon O. 
Newman, Cir. Judge, 2d Cir.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20090709/ 
Newman_testimony.pdf (criticizing the enhancements for child pornography offenses); 
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W. Ambrose nicely summarized this position by stating that in many child 
pornography cases, “strict application of the Sentencing Guidelines would 
create an injustice.”
73
  
[20] Now that sentencing judges are not bound to sentence within the 
Guidelines range, the sentiments of district judges are played out in 
several child pornography sentencing decisions. For example, in United 
States v. Booker,
74
 the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory 
and directed circuit courts to review sentences for “unreasonableness.”
75
  
In Booker and several follow-up cases, the Court explained that, in 
fashioning a reasonable sentence, a district judge must properly calculate 
the applicable Guidelines range and then tailor a sentence that satisfies the 
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
76
 In doing so, the 
 
                                                                                                                         
Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 3 (May 2009) (statement of Susan Oki 
Mollway, Dist. Judge, Dist. Of Haw.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/ 
20090527/Mollway_testimony.pdf (stating her concern about the “disproportionately 
high” child pornography sentences); Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 2 
(Feb. 2009) (statement of Gregory A. Presnell, Dist. Judge, Dist. Of Fla.), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20090210/Presnell_statement.pdf (explaining that 
courts afford less deference to the child pornography Guidelines because they are 
“inherently illogical” and “not based on any empirical data [sic] or institutional 
analysis”). 
73
 Federal Sentencing Practices and the Operation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
Reg’l Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, at 6 (July 2009) (statement of J. Donetta 
W. Ambrose, Chidf Judge, W.D. Pa.), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/ 
20090709/Ambrose_testimony.pdf.  
74
 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005). 
75
 Id. at 261. 
76
 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–60; see also Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007). The § 3553(a) sentencing factors include: (1) the 
kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the applicable category of 
offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines; 
(2) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission; (3) the need to 
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; (4) the need to provide restitution to victims; 
(5) the requirement to impose sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offense, 
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sentencing court must consider the applicable Guidelines range, but the 
sentencing court may chose to sentence the defendant outside of that 
range, when a Guidelines sentence would not satisfy the § 3553(a) 
sentencing factors.
77
 The Court clarified in Kimbrough v. United States
78
 
that a district court is also free to sentence a defendant outside of the 
applicable Guidelines range based on the district court’s determination 
that the policy underlying that range makes the range out of line with the 
sentencing factors.
79
 Several district judges have been exercising this 
discretion in sentencing child pornography offenders. 
[21] Approximately twenty-seven percent of offenders sentenced under 
§ 2G2.2 in 2007 received a sentence below the applicable Guidelines 
range.
80
 A year later, this number was up to approximately thirty-six 
percent sentenced below the Guidelines range.
81
 Of course, several critics 
have taken issue with what these below-Guidelines sentences imply: that 
the Guidelines often lead to unreasonably long sentences for child 
pornography offenders. These critiques are levied even in the cases of 
possession without any evidence of physical child abuse by the possessor.  
[22] Some critics argue that the case against the child pornography 
possession guidelines fails to appreciate “the true nature of the crime and 
 
                                                                                                                         
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect 
the public, and effectively provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training and medical care. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
77
 See Gall, 522 U.S. at 49–50. 
78
 522 U.S. 85, 111 (2007). 
79
 See id. at 108–11. 
80
 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, TABLE 28: SENTENCES RELATIVE TO THE GUIDELINE RANGE BY 
EACH PRIMARY SENTENCING GUIDELINE FISCAL YEAR 2007, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/2007/ 
Table28.pdf (showing that the twenty-seven percent calculation was determined by 
adding together those sentences that were labeled “Downward Departure” as well as 
those labeled “Below Range” on the Table 28). 
81
 Id. 
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the harm caused” by the offender.
82
 At the heart of such arguments is the 
claim that child pornography possession itself hurts the children in the 
images and that the possession of child pornography is often a precursor to 
or evidence of past abuse of children by that particular offender.
83
 For 
instance, Alexander Gelber, Assistant Deputy Chief in the CEOS, takes 
the position that viewing child pornography exploits the children in the 
images and “reinforce[s] the concept that a sexual attraction to children is 
normal and acceptable.”
84
 According to this view, possession of child 
pornography is punishable because it “contribute[s] to the market demands 
for more product, which means more child abuse.”
85
 Further, Gelber noted 
a study in which convicted child pornography possessors reported “a high 
incidence of previously undisclosed contact offenses against children.”
86
  
[23] Testimony given by Ernie Allen, President of the National Center 
for Missing & Exploited Children, echoed Gelber’s sentiment.
87
 Speaking 
before the Sentencing Commission, Allen stated: “Viewing [child 
pornography] is often the first step in the eventual sexual victimization of 
 
                                                                                                                         
82
 ALEXANDER GELBER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RESPONSE TO “A RELUCTANT REBELLION” 
16 (2009), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/ReluctantRebellionResponse.pdf.  
83
 See Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847, 
852–54 (2008) (explaining that children are harmed by the circulation of images of their 
exploitation and claiming that “the linkage between possession and molestation may be 
even greater than previously thought”). 
84
 GELBER, supra note 80, at 5. 
85
 Id.  
86
 Id. at 6 (citing Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The ‘Butner Study’ Redux: 
A Report of the Incidence of Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography 
Offenders, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 183, 187 (2009) (“85% [of the inmates studied] admitted 
they had at least one hands-on sexual offense, a 59% increase in the number of subjects 
with known hands-on offenses.”)). 
87
 Ernie Allen, President & CEO, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children (October 
20, 2009) (Written Testimony to the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n), http://www.missingkids.com/ 
missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=4144 (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
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an actual child.”
88
 Though Allen did not suggest that this is true for all 
child pornography possessors, he cited to studies which “suggest that 
some population of offenders will transition from viewing child 
pornography images, to needing to view more extreme images, to 
offending actual children.”
89
 Allen further stated that even just viewing the 
images without having had illegal contact with a particular minor 
“undeniably revictimizes the child who initially was violated.”
90
 The 
rationale for this position is that: 
[O]nce an image is placed on the Internet, it can never be 
removed and becomes a permanent record of the abuse 
inflicted upon that child. Each and every time such an 
image is viewed, traded, printed, or downloaded, the child 
in that image is re-victimized.
91
 
Therefore, the argument is that the harm of child pornography possession 
occurs with each viewing of an image, even for offenders who are not 
engaging in illegal physical contact with any children. These critics 
suggest that district judges who disagree with the child pornography 
Guidelines are ignoring these harms and dangers of child pornography 
possession. 
[24] Independent of the validity of the arguments made about the ills of 
child pornography possession, it is difficult to argue that district courts are 
ignoring the seriousness of this offense, even those courts that are 
sentencing child pornography possessors to below-Guidelines ranges. A 
glance at reasons given by district courts for imposing those below-
 
                                                                                                                         
88
 Id. at V. 
89
 Id. 
90
 Id.  
91
 Id. at VI. 
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Guidelines sentences discredits such a view. The oft-cited case, United 
States v. Baird,
92
 illustrates this point. 
[25] In Baird, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child 
pornography and was sentenced pursuant to § 2G2.2, starting with a base 
offense level of eighteen.
93
 Due to several enhancements, including one 
for the use of a computer, as well as a downward adjustment for 
acceptance of responsibility, the defendant’s total offense level was 
twenty-three.
94
 The defendant did not have a criminal history, and the 
resulting advisory Guidelines range was forty-six to fifty-seven months 
imprisonment.
95
 The district court decided to impose a sentence of two 
years, which was twenty-two months below the applicable Guidelines 
range.
96
 In imposing this below-Guidelines sentence, the court 
acknowledged that “possession of child pornography is a serious 
offense.”
97
 The court agreed with the views of those who support the 
increased length of child pornography Guidelines when it noted that “[t]he 
primary victims of the crime of possession of pornography are the 
exploited children.”
98
 While recognizing those harms of child 
pornography possession, the court still felt that a Guidelines sentence 
would be unreasonably long. The Baird court rightly concluded that the 
 
                                                                                                                         
92
According to Westlaw, United States v. Baird has been cited positively in case opinions 
twenty times. It has also appeared in 93 appellate court documents, trial motions, 
memoranda, and affidavits (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
93
 United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889, 889 (D. Neb. 2008). 
94
 Id. at 892–93. 
95
 Id. at 893. 
96
 Id. at 895. 
97
 Id. at 893. 
98
 Id. 
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harm to the victim is not the sole sentencing consideration in determining 
the seriousness of the offense.
99
 Though most of the reasons given by the 
court for imposing a sentence below the applicable Guidelines range were 
specific to the offender before it,
100
 the court also made a general 
statement about child pornography possession: 
Possession of pornography is the least serious of the crimes 
on the continuum of conduct – from possession to 
distribution to production to predatory abuse – that exploits 
children. A possessor of child pornography is considerably 
less culpable than a producer or distributor of the 
exploitative materials and is [sic] a marginal player in the 
overall child exploitation scheme.
101
 
Further, the Baird court described the current child pornography 
Guidelines as a “response to statutory directives” rather than the result of 
the “Commission’s unique institutional strengths.”
102
 The court found the 
applicable Guidelines range to be “a less reliable appraisal of a fair 
sentence.”
103
 This critique of the Guidelines had nothing to do with the 
court misunderstanding the nature of child pornography possession or a 
failure to believe that the offense was harmful. Instead, the court took 
issue with the increases to the child pornography Guidelines ranges being 
based on a political rather than a studied response.
104
 Consequently, the 
Baird court chose a two-year sentence to “more closely approximate the 
sentencing range that was in effect before the Sentencing Commission, in 
 
                                                                                                                         
99
 Id. 
100
 The court discusses that the defendant’s conduct happened a number of years ago, did 
not continue, and that mental health professionals had determined that he was at low risk 
to reoffend and was not a pedophile. Id. at 893–94. 
101
 Id. at 893. 
102
 Id. at 894–95. 
103
 Id. at 894. 
104
 Id. at 894–95. 
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response to a Congressional directive [that] collapsed the guideline 
dealing with possession . . . into the guideline dealing with trafficking of 
pornography . . . in 2003.”
105
 Thus, the court’s decision to impose a 
below-Guidelines sentence reflects its recognition of a distinction between 
child pornography possessors, distributors, and producers, which the court 
felt was absent from the Guidelines increases.
106
 The reasoning in Baird—
finding the increase in child pornography possession Guidelines to be a 
political, rather than an empirical response—is replicated in many cases in 
which district courts sentence a child pornography possessor below the 
applicable Guidelines range.
107
 
 
                                                                                                                         
105
 Id. at 895. 
106
 Id. (explaining that combining the Guidelines for child pornography offenses and “the 
application of significant quantity-driven enhancements for the number of images, has 
served to muddy the qualitative distinctions between ‘mere possession’ and ‘distribution 
of child pornography.’”). 
107
 See, e.g., United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 392 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing to 
the method of developing the current child pornography Guidelines as a reason for them 
deserving less deference); United States v. Phinney, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1043 (E.D. 
Wis. 2009) (“Not only is this guideline not based on Commission study or expertise, it is 
directly contrary to the Commission's original, studied approach, and to several of its 
subsequent recommendations and reports. Accordingly, I concluded that the range under 
the 2008 guideline was worthy of little respect or deference.”); United States v. Hanson, 
561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (discussing the flawed progression of the 
Guidelines for child pornography offenses); United States v. Manke, No. 09-CR-172, 
2010 WL 307937, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2010) (describing the child pornography 
possession Guidelines as “a guideline which I and other judges across the country have 
recognized is seriously flawed and accordingly entitled to little respect.”); United States 
v. Cruikshank, No. 2:09-cr-00102, 2009 WL 3673096, at *4–5 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 6, 
2009) (describing child exploitation offenses as pandemic yet determining that the child 
pornography Guidelines were not due the same degree of deference as the Guidelines for 
certain other offenses); United States v. Goldberg, No. 05CR0922, 2008 WL 4542957, at 
*6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2008) (“Furthermore, there is reason to be skeptical concerning 
whether the current guidelines for the specific offense with which Goldberg is charged 
reflect, as originally intended, an empirical analysis by the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
of judicial sentencing practices.”); United States v. Sudyka, No. 8:07CR383, 2008 WL 
1766765, at *7–8 (D.Neb. Apr. 14, 2008) (finding that child pornography possession is a 
serious crime and that criminalizing it is necessary to destroying the market for it, yet 
giving a below-Guidelines sentence based in part on an assessment that the Guidelines 
range for this offense was not reliable). 
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[26] Of course, judicial divergence from the child pornography 
possession Guidelines is not necessarily a reason for the Sentencing 
Commission to completely revamp those Guidelines. Certainly, not all 
district judges have indicated a willingness to depart from those 
Guidelines based upon policy disagreements with the increases to the base 
offense level and the numerous enhancements.
108
 Though nearly one-third 
of the child pornography possession sentences are below the applicable 
Guidelines range, two-thirds are not.
109
 However, the type of criticism 
directed towards the child pornography Guidelines signals the sort of 
disagreement that could lead to increased deviation from the Sentencing 
Commission’s recommendations. Courts deviate from the Guidelines, not 
because they find them inapplicable to a particular defendant’s situation, 
but because they find them unreliable and unstudied. Thus, those 
Guidelines become increasingly less relevant as a sentencing tool. 
Additionally, as judges continue to speak out about their belief that the 
child pornography possession Guidelines are due little deference, that 
sentiment will likely be adopted by more of the bench. The danger is that 
as district judges impose non-Guidelines sentences for policy rather than 
individualized sentencing reasons, a guidance void will be left.  
[27] This potential outcome is one that both the Sentencing 
Commission and Congress should care about, and that should prompt a 
closer look at the root of the problem with those Guidelines. As more 
district judges indicate distrust of the child pornography sentencing 
Guidelines, those judges will have to depend upon their own assessment of 
what would be a categorically reasonable sentencing range for most child 
pornography possessors. While trial judges may be in the best position to 
tailor individualized sentences for a particular defendant within a set of 
similar offenders,
110
 it does not mean that they are in the best position to 
 
                                                                                                                         
108
 See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, No. 1:09CR154, 2010 WL 308822 (N.D. Ohio 
Jan. 26, 2010) (finding no merit in the criticisms of the child pornography Guidelines). 
109
 Id. at 7.  
110
 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357–58 (2007) (“The sentencing judge has 
access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant 
before him than the Commission or the appeals court.”); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 
81, 98 (1996) (“District courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts in 
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determine sentencing policy.
111
 As the imposers of sentences, district 
judges know that it is their duty to impose reasonable sentences, even if 
that means breaking away from the Guidelines and attempting to set 
sentencing policy on their own.
112
 This break would not be problematic if 
district judges were systematically selecting similar sentences for child 
pornography possessors and appellate judges were providing predictable 
guidance on the reasonableness of sentences for child pornography 
possessors. But this does not appear to be the case. Instead, the sentencing 
of child pornography possessors has become quite unpredictable for both 
district and appellate courts. At least some of this inconsistency is due to a 
lack of uniform understanding of the role of computers and the Internet in 
child pornography possession.  
[28] There does not seem to be any determinable pattern in the 
appellate decisions upholding and reversing child pornography possession 
sentences. In United States v. Pugh, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a 
sentence of five years probation for a defendant convicted of child 
pornography possession who had no criminal history.
113
 The applicable 
Guidelines range mandated 97 to 120 months of imprisonment, but the 
 
                                                                                                                         
making these sorts of determinations, especially as they see so many more Guidelines 
cases than appellate courts do.”). 
111
 See Rita, 551 U.S. at 349. (“The Guidelines as written reflect the fact that the 
Sentencing Commission examined tens of thousands of sentences and worked with the 
help of many others in the law enforcement community over a long period of time in an 
effort to fulfill this statutory mandate.”); Kimbrough v. United States, 522 U.S. 85, 108–9 
(2007) (“Congress established the Commission to formulate and constantly refine 
national sentencing standards . . . carrying out its charge, the Commission fills an 
important institutional role: It has the capacity courts lack to ‘base its determinations on 
empirical data and national experience, guided by a professional staff with appropriate 
expertise.’”) (citing United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(McConnell, J., concurring)). 
112
 See Rita, 551 U.S. at 351 (explaining that a presumption of reasonableness for 
Guidelines range sentences can only be an appellate presumption and district courts must 
still decide whether a sentence that fall within that range reflects the § 3553(a) sentencing 
factors).  
113
 See generally United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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Eleventh Circuit concluded that, though the district court correctly 
calculated the Guidelines range, “it did not give any real weight to the 
Guidelines range in imposing the sentence.”
114
 Ultimately, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that “a sentence of probation, without a single day in jail or 
any period of supervised release is an unreasonable one.”
115
 The Eleventh 
Circuit opinion in Pugh reveals that differing views of the effect of 
computer usage on the offense and the offender’s culpability is at least 
part of the disagreement between the district and appellate courts’ 
decisions. On the one hand, the district court described the defendant’s 
possession of child pornography as “‘passive’ and ‘incidental’ to his actual 
goal of developing online relationships . . . .”
116
 The Eleventh Circuit, on 
the other hand, described the defendant’s illegal computer activity as 
“neither isolated, unintentional nor lawful.”
117
 It may seem understandable 
that the Eleventh Circuit would find a sentence of only probation to be 
unreasonable for a defendant who “repeatedly downloaded the child 
pornography images and videos at least 70 times over a period of several 
years;”
118
 especially given the extreme explicit nature of those images.
119
 
This position, however, does not reveal any consistent understanding 
across circuits of appropriate sentences for those who possess child 
pornography on computers. Surveying other circuits dealing with similar 
below-Guidelines sentences shows this inconsistency.  
 
                                                                                                                         
114
 Id. at 1182, 1200. 
115
 Id. at 1204. The period of probation did include certain terms, including that Pugh: 
“(1) continue his mental health treatment; (2) not possess a computer with internet 
access; (3) consent to periodic, unannounced examinations of any computer equipment he 
possessed; (4) submit to searches based on reasonable suspicion; and (5) register with the 
state sex-offender registry.” Id. at 1187. 
116
 Id at 1187. 
117
 Id. at 1193. 
118
 Id. 
119
 See id. at 1182. 
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[29] In some circuits, probation with no term of imprisonment for a 
child pornography possessor has been upheld even though the defendants’ 
circumstances are not much different than the defendant in Pugh.
120
 For 
instance, in United States v. Autery,
121
 the Ninth Circuit upheld a sentence 
of five years of probation for a child pornography possessor, 
notwithstanding the defendant’s plea deal agreeing to a Guidelines range 
of forty-one to fifty-one months of imprisonment.
122
 The defendant in 
Autery was accused of having over 150 images of child pornography on 
his computer, and yet the district court still agreed to a sentence with no 
incarceration.
123
 Like the Pugh case, the defendant in Autery had no 
criminal history and was not accused of having inappropriate contact with 
children.
124
 Again, computer usage played an important role in how the 
courts viewed the offense. The district court found it important that the 
defendant was not using his computer to “order” a specific type of 
customized child pornography, and the appellate court found this 
consideration appropriate.
125
 Not only did both the district and circuit 
courts recognize the harms created by participating in the child 
 
                                                                                                                         
120
 See, e.g., United States v. Rowan, 530 F.3d. 379 (5th Cir. 2008) (court upholds a five-
year probationary sentence with no imprisonment); United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864 
(9th Cir. 2009). 
121
 Autery, 555 F.3d at 875. 
122
 Id. The conditions of the defendant’s probation were: (i) registration as a sex offender; 
(ii) prohibition from viewing any pornography whatsoever; (iii) barred from being within 
100 feet of places where minors congregate unless approved by his probation officer; (iv) 
prohibited from travel outside the State of Oregon without prior approval; (v) 
participation in mental health evaluation and counseling, including psychotherapy, and 
taking any prescription drugs as directed; (vi) prohibited from possessing any firearm; 
(vii) barred from using any computer except for work, or, without approval, any other 
electronic media-such as a personal digital assistant or cellular phone-with Internet 
capability; and (viii) prohibited from having “direct or indirect” contact with anyone 
under the age of eighteen, except his own children. Id. 
123
 Id. at 867. 
124
 See Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1187; see also Autery, 555 F.3d at 867, 874. 
125
 Autery, 555 F.3d at 873–75. 
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pornography market, but both accepted probation as a reasonable sentence 
for the computer possessor.
126
  
[30] Similar inconsistencies can be found in cases in which child 
pornography possessors receive sentences involving incarceration. The 
Sixth Circuit upheld a sentence of one-day incarceration and a ten-year 
period of supervised release in United States v. Stall.
127
 The defendant in 
Stall had no criminal history and possessed eighteen images of child 
pornography on his computer; however, he admitted to having 
downloaded child pornography over several years and viewing many more 
than eighteen images.
128
 Ultimately, the Guidelines called for a sentence 
of fifty-seven to seventy-one months incarceration.
129
 In imposing a 
below-Guidelines sentence, the district court gave deference to the 
testimony of a psychologist who explained that “internet sex offenders 
were significantly less likely to fail in the community than child molesters 
in terms of all types of recidivism.”
130
 Though the Sixth Circuit 
commented that it would not have imposed the same sentence, it found 
that the district court had not abused its discretion in imposing the 
sentence.
131
 In contrast, the Eighth Circuit reversed a longer sentence for a 
defendant with a lower applicable Guidelines range.
132
  
 
                                                                                                                         
126
 Id. at 873–78. 
127
 581 F.3d 276, 277–78 (6th Cir. 2009). Stall pleaded guilty to receipt of child 
pornography which carries the same base offense level as child pornography possession 
under § 2G2.2. Id. at 278. 
128
 Id. at 277–78. 
129
 Id. at 278. 
130
 Id. at 279. 
131
 Id. at 286.  
132
 See generally United States v. Grinbergs, 470 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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[31] In the Eighth Circuit case United States v. Grinbergs, the 
Guidelines range was forty-six to fifty-seven months, and the district court 
imposed a sentence of twelve months and one day of incarceration 
following the defendant’s plea of guilty to child pornography 
possession.
133
 Just as in Stall, the nature of the defendant’s Internet and 
computer usage was an important factor in the district court’s decision to 
impose a below-Guidelines sentence.
134
 At the sentencing hearing, the 
defendant presented testimony of a mental health and addiction specialist 
who opined that “Grinbergs was not a typical child sex offender or a 
predator but instead had fallen victim to the Internet, which provided him 
with an easy outlet for his desire for attention.”
135
 The Eighth Circuit 
found that this testimony did not make the defendant different from the 
typical offender punished under the same statute.
136
 The Eight Circuit 
subsequently held that the below-Guidelines sentence was 
unreasonable.
137
 On appeal, the Supreme Court directed this sentence to be 
reviewed in light of its newly-issued decision in Gall v. United States, 
which held that district courts were not required to point to 
“extraordinary” circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines 
range.
138
 On remand, the district court again imposed the same below-
Guidelines sentence.
139
 The district court explained that Grinbergs was not 
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 Id. at 759.  
134
 Id. at 759–60. 
135
 Id. at 760. 
136
 Id at 761. 
137
 Id. 
138
 Grinbergs v. United States, 552 U.S. 1088 (2008) (relying on the proposition in Gall, 
552 U.S. at 47). 
139
 United States v. Grinbergs, No. 8:05CR232, 2008 WL 4191145, at *11 (D. Neb. Sept. 
8, 2008). 
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the typical child pornography offender.
140
 However, the district court’s 
discussions about the Guidelines reveal that it also disagreed with the 
child pornography possession Guidelines in general.
141
 The district court 
shared many of the same criticisms of the child pornography possession 
guidelines that this Article has previously discussed. For instance, after 
explaining the harms of child pornography possession, the district court 
stated: “A possessor of child pornography is considerably less culpable 
than one who produces or distributes the exploitative materials and is a 
marginal player in the overall child exploitation scheme.”
142
 The district 
court also stated that “in view of the fact that the child pornography 
Guidelines are statutorily-driven, as opposed to empirically grounded, the 
court finds that the Guideline ranges of imprisonment are not a reliable 
appraisal of a fair sentence in this case.”
143
 Further, the district court noted 
that “the Internet has become the typical means of obtaining child 
pornography” and determined that the defendant was a small player whose 
computer conduct did not fall within the type of large-scale harm that the 
computer enhancements were meant to punish.
144
 
[32] All of these cases demonstrate the inconsistent guidance available 
to district courts that are critical of the existing Sentencing Guidelines on 
what constitutes a reasonable sentence for child pornography possession. 
At times circuit courts uphold very short sentences, while at other times, 
they do not. Moreover, while it is not necessarily problematic for circuit 
courts to disagree about the reasonableness of sentences, the 
disagreements demonstrate the void that is left when courts at either level, 
are unclear as to the meaningfulness of the Sentencing Guidelines for 
certain offenses. It is evident from these cases that some district courts are 
finding that even “typical” child pornography possessors—first time 
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 Id. at *2. 
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 Id. at *9–11.  
142
 Id. at *9. 
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 Id. at *10. 
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Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XVI, Issue 3 
32 
offenders with no history of physically abusing children—should be 
sentenced below the applicable Guidelines range. Therefore, there is a 
need for a more consistent understanding of child pornography possession 
and appropriate sentences for such offenders. 
III.  REBOOTING NOTIONS OF POSSESSION 
[33] At the heart of the criticisms of the child pornography Guidelines 
is the view that the increases to the base offense level and the several 
enhancements do not correlate to the actual harm created by the typical 
offender. The Sentencing Commission has included child pornography 
possession in § 2G2.2, the Guidelines provision that also covers 
production and distribution of child pornography.
145
 There is little 
disagreement about the seriousness of child pornography possession and 
the profound harm to children that each image embodies. Despite the 
damage that possession of child pornography creates, courts are 
recognizing possession as the lowest culpability offense on the spectrum 
of child pornography offenses. Therefore, concerned district courts and 
other critics of the child pornography possession Guidelines are really just 
asking for the Guidelines to reflect the reality of the offense and the 
offender. 
A.  The Realities of Child Pornography Possession 
[34] Today’s child pornography possession offender looks very 
different from the offender of the 1990s, when child pornography was first 
criminalized. The Commission reported in 1995 that “a significant portion 
of child pornography offenders have a criminal history that involves 
sexual abuse or exploitation of children.”
146
 By 2006, however, 79.9% of 
child pornography defendants had no criminal history at all, including no 
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 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2010) applies the same base offense 
level to various types of child-pornography possession: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1466A(b), 
2225(a)(4), and 2255A(a)(5), as well as to distribution and production of child 
pornography: 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(7). 
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 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: SEX OFFENSES AGAINST 
CHILDREN: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING FEDERAL PENALTIES, i 
(1996), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/scac.pdf. 
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prior sexual abuse or exploitation offenses.
147
 A year later, in 2007, courts 
found only 5% of child pornography defendants to be involved in the 
production of child pornography.
148
 Today’s typical child pornography 
possessor is a first time offender for whom there is no evidence of child 
pornography production.
149
 This person is quite different from the 
offender who would have been sentenced under the more lenient, earlier 
Guidelines. This fact makes the steady increase in the Guidelines ranges 
for child pornography possession very curious. 
[35] The child pornography possessor looks different today because the 
manner of possessing child pornography has changed dramatically. The 
U.S. Department of Justice explains that post mail was the primary means 
of distributing child pornography in the 1980s.
150
 By 2006, however, 97% 
of child pornography defendants committed the offense using a 
computer.
151
 When it comes to child pornography possession, computers 
and the Internet certainly make it easier to carry out the offense, and also 
make it easier to amass more sentencing enhancements without 
necessarily being a more harmful offender. For these reasons, two 
evidentiary issues must be addressed to better understand the realities of 
child pornography today. 
[36] First, there is a question of proof that the enhancements should 
even apply. Though many offenders admit to viewing and storing child 
pornography on their computers, it is often unclear just how many images 
 
                                                                                                                         
147
 See Mark Motivans & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Federal Prosecution of Child Sex 
Exploitation Offenders, 2006, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., December 2007, at 5, 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf. 
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 See STABENOW, supra note 48, at 13 (citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, TABLE 17: 
OFFENDERS SENTENCED FOR EACH CHAPTER TWO GUIDELINE FISCAL YEAR 2007, 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (2007), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/ ANNRPT/2007/Table17.pdf). 
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 Id. 
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 See Motivans & Kyckelhahn, supra note 147, at 2. 
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 See id. at 6. 
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the court should attribute to a particular offender. For example, law-
enforcement officials sometimes recover portions of deleted files or pieces 
of overwritten files, but it may not be absolutely evident whether or not 
the defendant deleted those files or whether they were present before the 
defendant received the computer.
152
  
[37] Second, there is the issue of hidden files. When a person 
downloads an image or enters a site, that person’s computer might also 
unknowingly receive a type of hidden file called a thumbnails database.
153
 
Further, when a person views a seemingly legal adult pornography 
website, the website can automatically bombard the computer with 
cookies and pop-ups that may include child pornography.
154
 Though this 
all may sound like an issue of proof for conviction, because most 
defendants will plead guilty, the issue of hidden files usually does not 
become relevant until sentencing, where the burden of proof is only a 
preponderance of the evidence.
155
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 See, e.g., Hollander, supra note 9, at 58 (describing a case where the state’s technician 
recovered pieces of images from the defendant’s computer). 
153
 Id. 
154
 Id. at *4; see Kathleen M. Sweeny, Internet Pornography Laws, Precedents, and 
Defense, in STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY CASES: LEADING 
LAWYERS ON ANALYZING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS, UTILIZING EXPERT WITNESSES, AND 
EXPLAINING TECHNOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 27, 31 (Aspatore ed., 2008) (stating that 
“[i]nternet child pornography cases also involve a greater likelihood of mistake of error, 
since images are frequently downloaded from Web sites in bundles, or information is 
automatically downloaded to a computer with software from newsgroups or other 
unscreened public areas, and therefore the potential that a defendant was not aware of the 
files being on his or her computer are substantial.”). 
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 In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that due process was satisfied 
when facts used during sentencing were found by a preponderance of the evidence. 477 
U.S. 79, 91 (1986). Circuit courts, both pre- and post-United States v. Booker, have held 
that this standard also applies to sentencing facts and enhancements for Guidelines 
purposes. 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 
1989); United States v. Cruz-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 721, 727 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Ubiera, 486 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568 (3d 
Cir. 2007); United States v. Bragg, 148 Fed. App’x. 885, 860–61 (11th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Clonts, 966 F.2d 1366, 1371 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ross, 905 F.2d 
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[38] These issues illustrate how computer technology often makes it 
difficult to be confident in the numbers of images that should apply to the 
possible Guidelines enhancements. However, even when the number of 
images possessed is either clear or agreed to, it is still not apparent that the 
quantity of images possessed on a computer correlates to the amount of 
harm that a defendant has caused, thus warranting more enhancements and 
higher Guidelines ranges.  Therefore, it is useful to address how these 
enhancements are often disconnected from any studied assessment of 
whether or why harsher sentences are warranted for defendants with 
certain characteristics. 
B.  Harm and Enhancements: Making the Sentencing Compute 
[39] One harm created by the possession of child pornography cited by 
courts, practitioner, and scholars is the possessor’s contribution to the 
child pornography market.
156
 It is not necessary to take issue with the 
contention that child pornography possessors contribute in some way to 
the viability of the child pornography market to critique the position that 
the Guidelines’ image enhancements for child pornography possession 
capture this harm. The Guidelines’ image enhancement approach assumes 
that possessing more images means that a defendant has contributed more 
significantly to the child pornography market. As Southern District of 
West Virginia Judge Joseph Goodwin recently pointed out, “this market-
based justification does not support the number-of-images enhancement in 
section 2G2.2(b)(7).”
157
 Judge Goodwin questioned the connection 
between number of images and the actual effect of possession on the 
market.
158
 He concluded: “The worldwide market for child pornography is 
 
                                                                                                                         
1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1236 (4th 
Cir. 1989). 
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 GELBER, supra note 80, at 5 (explaining that possession of child pornography is 
punishable because it “contribute[s] to the market demands for more product, which 
means more child abuse.”). 
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 United States v. Raby, No. 2:05-cr-00003, 2009 WL 5173964, at *7 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 
30, 2009).  
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so vast that the relative market impact of having even 592 additional 
images is miniscule.”
159
 
[40] It is immaterial whether Judge Goodwin’s assessment is correct. 
More important is his identification of perceived deficiencies in the 
Guidelines resulting in him giving less credence to the Guidelines when 
sentencing child pornography offenders. One deficiency is based on the 
failure of the Sentencing Commission to explain how the enhancements 
are in fact related to an incremental increase in the offender’s contribution 
to the child pornography market in a manner that justifies the increased 
sentencing range. The history of the image enhancements reveals that the 
Sentencing Commission has failed to do so because the image 
enhancements were based upon a brief amendment to the PROTECT Act 
proposed quickly and without notification to or consultation with the 
Sentencing Commission.
160
 The only information given by Congressman 
Tom Feeney, who proposed the amendment provision adding the image 
enhancements included in the “Sentencing Reform,” was that “penalties 
are increased based on the amount of child pornography involved in the 
offense.”
161
 As Representative Feeney explained, the actual focus of the 
amendment was to “ensure more faithful adherence to the guidelines.”
162
 
Thus, the image enhancements exist as unexplained sentence increases 
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 Id. at *2–8. The defendant in Raby was sentenced under § 2G2.2, but received a base 
offense level of twenty-two rather than the eighteen level base that applies to possession 
because he was charged with a higher level of receipt. Id. at *2. Though he had no 
criminal history, after the various enhancements were applied (and a few decreases), his 
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that are not tied to the purpose of the overall amendment in which they 
appear.  
[41] Objecting to the Feeney Amendment, Representative Robert Scott 
explained that the problem with the amendment was the lack of “hearings 
or markups on this matter [which was] not the way [to] amend the 
sentencing guidelines, without thought or consideration.”
163
 
Representative Scott suggested turning the matter over to the Sentencing 
Commission and further discussing it through “hearings, subcommittee 
markup, [and] committee markup,” rather than deciding it on a floor 
amendment.
164
 However, the Sentencing Committee never completed the 
proposed examination and the amendment passed on the floor.
165
 Thus, the 
sentencing enhancements advised by the Guidelines based upon number of 
images possessed appears to be divorced from any study of actual increase 
in harm caused by the offender. 
[42] Additionally, there is that argument that, despite the effect on the 
market, child pornography possession has a detrimental effect on the 
victims in the images. This argument relies on studies indicating that each 
viewing of an image of child abuse re-victimizes the child in that image.
166
 
These studies report that “a significant part of the healing process for 
children traumatized by sexual abuse is the ability to control the disclosure 
of the abuse.”
167
 Accordingly, each time an offender views an image, he is 
causing harm to the victim by robbing the victim of the ability to control 
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 See Allen, supra note 87, at VI. 
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 Id. (citing ETHEL QUAYLE ET AL., CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
OF CHILDREN ONLINE 46 (2008), available at http://www.childcentre.info/ 
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access to and circulation of the depictions of the abuse.
168
 In sum, the 
more images are viewed, the more incidences of harm caused by the 
offender to the victim, and the more deserving the offender is of increased 
punishment.  
[43] One difficulty with this line of thought is that possession and 
viewing may not be synonymous. For example, it is possible for an 
offender to possess images that he has not actually seen either by 
downloading directly or by accessing a file with several images or by 
unknowingly downloading images that have hidden thumbnail files 
associated with them.
169
 File-sharing, as the most popular method for 
obtaining child pornography, presents another opportunity for an offender 
to have access to shared files containing images that he has never seen or 
even attempted to view.
170
  
[44] Another difficulty with the argument that possessing multiple 
images of child pornography increases the harm to victims is that the 
description of the harm actually suggests that the damage is done in the 
first instance of providing Internet accessibility to the images. The 
victim’s harm arises from, and is limited to, the knowledge that “the 
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 See Rogers, supra note 2, at 862. 
[T]he possessor causes actual harm because re-publication inflicts 
shame and humiliation upon the child depicted. This psychological 
damage can lead to anti-social, destructive and depressive behavior. 
The circulation over the Internet to innumerable individuals who 
receive, possess and view the images cause the victims to suffer further 
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resurface at any time. 
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 See, e.g., Hollander, supra note 9, at 58; Sweeny, supra note 154, at 31. 
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 See Kris Pickel, 'Accidental' Download Sending Man To Prison (Dec. 2, 2009), 
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images are forever in cyberspace, able to resurface at any time.”
171
 The 
victim does not actually know how many people have viewed or saved the 
images.
172
 But this specific knowledge is immaterial to whether the victim 
would feel harm from the potential of the images being viewed. Therefore, 
in reality, one additional person possessing the images makes little 
difference to the victim and is much less harmful than the initial posting of 
an image to the Internet.  
[45] To align with this circulation-harm argument, a more severe 
Guidelines enhancement ought to apply to the person who first uploaded 
the images to the Internet, whether or not that person is the producer of the 
images. It is this particular offender who has made the images accessible 
and able to resurface at any time. At that point, because the victim would 
constantly fear that such viewing could happen at any moment, the victim 
would experience the harm created by the potential of circulation, even if 
the images are never viewed. Therefore, a person that actually views the 
images after they have been uploaded has not added to the harm, 
especially since the victim would not actually know about the number of 
people viewing the image. Thus, even if the possessor has viewed all of 
the images, he is not incrementally more harmful to the victim in this 
manner based solely on the number of images he possesses. 
[46] Once the market and re-victimization arguments are rethought, the 
only reason to increase an offender’s offense level based on the number of 
images possessed is the belief that viewing more images makes the 
offender more deviant. With each image possessed, the offender 
demonstrates an increased willingness to break the law. As already 
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 Of course, there could be a situation in which the victim does know how many people 
have viewed the image before any offender is charged. If that is the case and the offender 
had any causal connection to the victim’s knowledge, then there would be an argument 
that the offender should receive increased punishment. Otherwise, the argument holds 
that an unknown possessor has not increased the original harm of potential circulation to 
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explained, it is possible to amass a large number of images on a computer 
quite easily and even unintentionally. Thus, if an offender has hundreds of 
child pornography images on his computer, it does not necessarily mean 
that all of those images were collected individually, or that all of the 
pictures were intentionally downloaded. Even if every possessor possessed 
each image purposefully, the image enhancements are still not clearly 
appropriate. 
[47] Possessing child pornography certainly deserves punishment, but it 
is unclear how having 150 to 300 images stored on an offender’s computer 
necessarily makes that offender more deviant than an offender who has 10 
to 150 images stored on his computer. The Guidelines treat computer 
possession in the same manner that it treats traditional possession 
crimes—by increasing enhancements based upon quantities of illegally 
possessed items. An obvious example of this traditional approach is drug 
offenses. The current Guidelines have seventeen different categories of 
offense levels for various drug quantities.
173
 For instance, the possession 
of three kilograms to less than ten kilograms of heroin gets a base offense 
level of thirty-four.
174
 An offender would receive a base offense level of 
thirty-six for possessing ten kilograms to less than thirty kilograms of 
heroin.
175
 The base offense level would be thirty-eight for the possession 
of thirty kilograms or more of heroin.
176
 This would result in an increase 
in the applicable Guidelines ranges for a first time offender in the 
following manner: 151 to 188 months for less than 10 kilograms of heroin; 
188 to 235 months for 10 kilograms to less than 30 kilograms of heroin; 
and 235 to 293 months of imprisonment for possessing 30 kilograms or 
more of heroin.
177
 This effectively increases the possible Guidelines 
sentence from twelve and a half years to over twenty-four years of 
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incarceration for a difference of twenty kilograms of heroin. In his 
statement before the Sentencing Commission, Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals Judge Jon Newman questioned this approach to punishment, 
which he has termed “precise incremental immorality.”
178
 Judge Newman 
explained that the issue with such an approach is that “every minute 
increment of offense conduct must result in a minute increment of 
punishment.”
179
 The difficulty of having meaningful sentencing 
enhancements based upon quantity is that it is unclear how the possession 
of a few more illegal items truly makes one offender different from the 
offender with a few less. This is especially true with child pornography 
possession when it is committed using a computer. 
[48] The child pornography possessor who views and stores the images 
on his computer operates very differently than the child pornography 
possessor who orders the illegal materials through the mail or undertakes a 
hand-to-hand purchase with the seller of child pornography in some illicit 
meeting place. Imagine the person who willfully orders 200 print images 
of child pornography through the mail, or the person who makes the effort 
to leave his house and meet someone to purchase 200 such images and 
then transport them home. Both of those offenders have to exert much 
more effort and conscious decision-making than the offender who pushes 
a few buttons on his computer to download those same 200 images. This is 
not to say that one offender is necessarily more or less culpable than are 
the others. When considering quantities, however, there is quite a 
distinction. While a sentencing enhancement for the non-computer 
offenders based on possession quantity may be warranted, such 
enhancements for the computer offender is not related to that offender’s 
culpability in the same manner. Of course, this critique is necessarily a 
critique of the two-level computer enhancement. With computer use being 
the typical manner in which child pornography possession manifests, and 
with the low effort that is required to carry out the offense, there is a good 
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argument that the sentencing enhancement should actually be applied to 
the child pornography possessor who does not use a computer to carry out 
the crime. In other words, a non-computer offender has to act with the 
determination necessary to actually demonstrate criminal deviance. Each 
of these arguments indicate a need for the Sentencing Commission to 
reconsider the child pornography possession guidelines in light of the 
realities of what the typical offense and offender look like today. 
CONCLUSION: SUGGESTIONS FOR THE NEW SYSTEM 
[49] Sentencing of child pornography possessors ought to reflect some 
study of how the imposed sentences relate to the harm and danger created 
by offenders. District judges are required to consider those factors in 
constructing appropriate sentences, and the Sentencing Guidelines claim 
to do so, as well.
180
 Because political trends, rather than sentencing 
research, have driven the increase in the child pornography possession 
Guidelines, some judges have lost confidence in their ability to guide the 
court to reasonable sentences. Now that district judges are no longer 
bound to follow the Guidelines, if the Guidelines are to be meaningful, the 
Sentencing Commission must persuade sentencing courts that the child 
pornography possession Guidelines are informative and useful. The 
Commission can do this by carrying out its mandate to study and consider 
appropriate sentences that reflect the purposes of sentencing recognized by 
Congress.
181
 However, for any revisions of the child pornography 
 
                                                                                                                         
180
 Among others, 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) requires that the sentencing court consider to the 
seriousness of the offense, the need to provide just punishment, and the need to protect 
the public from further crimes of the defendant. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (C). 
181
 28 U.S.C § 991(b) explains that the purposes of the Sentencing Commission are to 
establish sentencing practices that:  
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in [18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)]; (B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the 
purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 
similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to 
permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or 
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of 
general sentencing practices; and (C) reflect, to the extent practicable, 
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possession Guidelines to be effective, Congress must allow the Sentencing 
Commission to perform this task. Otherwise, courts will continue to depart 
from the Guidelines for policy reasons, resulting in the very increase in 
departures that Congress sought to avoid in recent amendments to increase 
the severity of the Guidelines. 
[50] Child pornography possessors deserve punishment for the harm 
and danger that their offense creates and the exploitation that the offense 
represents. Ultimately, however, any enhancements to child pornography 
possession sentences should reflect aspects of the offense that actually 
make the offender more harmful than the typical child pornography 
possessor. If the harm is based on contributing to market demand for child 
pornography, then the corresponding sentencing enhancement ought to 
apply to those who actually contributed to that demand in some manner 
that was truly more significant than other offenders. If the harm is re-
victimization through Internet access to the images, then only the 
possessor who also posted the images to the Internet ought to receive the 
enhancement. Further, any sentencing enhancements related to the notion 
that the more images a person possess demonstrates their increased 
willingness to break the law ought to only apply to defendants who had to 
take some significant steps or form the repeated intent to amass the 
additional images.  
[51] All of these possible revisions must reflect the influence of 
computers and the Internet on the offense in order for the sentencing 
guidance to be meaningful. Once the Commission conducts a true study to 
determine what makes one possessor worse than the next, and sentencing 
courts can see the relationship between the offense and the applicable 
Guidelines, then courts may be more likely to follow the Commission’s 
suggestions. The same can be done for other child pornography offenses 
beyond simple possession. Then, courts can reserve deviations from the 
Guidelines for individual, offender-specific reasons. This allows for 
district courts to act in their superior position of tailoring individualized 
 
                                                                                                                         
advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the 
criminal justice process . . . . 
Id. § 991(b)(1) (2006). 
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sentences, while the Sentencing Commission can carry out the promise of 
its institutional strength by setting reasoned sentencing policy.  
